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India’s Agni Missile Systems: Strengthening 




Over the years, India has been able to acquire a credible 
minimum nuclear deterrence. In this, the Agni missile 
system is integral to India‟s counter second-strike 
capability especially against China. The Agni category 
missiles are solid propelled ballistic missiles, ranging 
from short range missiles to intermediate range missiles 
(700-5000kms) with road and rail mobility providing 
greater chances of survivability during an enemy attack. 
This strengthens its scope of launching a counter/second 
strike. This makes India one of the few countries in the 
world with the ability to potentially decapitate its enemy 
by preserving its arsenal in the first attack from the 
enemy. This article provides a deep analysis of India‟s 
Agni missile systems. 
  
Keywords: Agni Missiles, Nuclear Detterance, Inter-Continental    
Range 
1. Introduction 
Ever since India conducted the nuclear tests in 1998, focus has been 
on strengthening the nuclear deterrence posture and chalking out a 
nuclear strategy. Over the years, it shifted from liquid-fuelled 
ballistic missiles to solid fuelled ones, concentrated on developing 
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nuclear capable cruise missiles as well as worked towards 
achieving a sea-based deterrent in order to strengthen its counter-
strike/ second-strike capability. The Agni category missiles are 
solid propelled ballistic missiles ranging from short range missiles 
to intermediate range missiles (700-5000 kms) with road and rail 
mobility providing greater chances of survivability during an 
enemy attack. This strengthens India‟s „no-first use‟ policy, 
mentioned in India‟s nuclear doctrine.  
India‟s nuclear strategy relies on a „credible minimum deterrence‟ 
(Rajaraman, 2014) posture for which the Agni category missile 
systems are best suited. They form the backbone of India‟s land-
based nuclear deterrence. In addition, there are reports that the 
Agni-V would be equipped with multiple independently targetable 
re-entry vehicle (MIRVs) thereby further increasing its deterrent 
value. However, it has also attracted concerns from around since 
MIRVs, according to Cold War literature, are first-strike weapon 
systems.  
In addition, India follows a posture of recessed deterrence whereby 
warheads are de-mated from their delivery systems. However, in 
the recent past, there have been reports that the Agni-V would be 
canister launched; that is, warheads would need to be mated with 
delivery systems. Mated weapon systems bring in added burden 
on command and control system and also raises the risk of launch 
on warning (LoW). All these factors result in the need to analyse 
the role of Agni category missiles, its deterrent value vis-à-vis 
Pakistan and China as well as the future nuances that could affect 
India‟s nuclear deterrence.  
2. History of Agni Missiles 
The Agni missile is a component of the Integrated Guided Missile 
Development Program (IGMDP) that was launched by India in 
1983 with a budget of $260 million and managed by Defence 
Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL). The Agni category 
missiles were to use the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) 
developed solid fuelled engines as opposed to the Prithvi category 
missiles that used the Devil Technology. In 1989,  India test fired 
Agni category missile that had a range of 1000-1500kms. It was the 
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Agni I category missile that was test fired, providing evidence of 
establishing re-entry technology and precise guidance to reach the 
specific target (The Economic Times, 2013). The first stage of the 
solid fuelled booster motor of the Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV-3) 
was used for the first stage of the two-staged Agni missile. After 
the missile was successfully test fired in 1989, the then Prime 
Minister, Rajiv Gandhi declared, “the technologies proved in Agni 
are deeply significant for evolving national security options” (Bobb, 
1989).  At the same time, he was careful to call  Agni a “technology 
demonstrator” and not a weapon system.” However, the missile 
did raise concerns in the United States especially as India had 
conducted the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974 and its 
plutonium resource could be used to make bombs. Hence, the 
Indian Government also clarified, “Technology has improved 
missile accuracy dramatically. As accuracy improves, the nuclear 
yield needed to destroy hard military targets also drops 
dramatically, to the point where conventional warheads could do 
the job” (Bobb, 1989).  
Though the Agni category missile underwent tests in 1992 and 
1994, the Agni project was stalled for a while and the operational 
version of the missile was first tested in 1999. One of the reasons for 
stalling the project was probably because of the US pressure 
imposed on India to stop the development of the Agni missile 
system. The revival of the programme was because of the 
conduction of the 1998 nuclear tests as there was a need to develop 
delivery mechanisms for India‟s nuclear warheads. However, prior 
to the nuclear tests in 1998, while many had thought that India had 
given up its Agni missile, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam who was in charge of 
the missile development program requested journalists, “please 
also don‟t write we have given up Agni. Because that will 
demoralise a lot of my people”(Prasannan, 2015). On why the 
missile was not being tested any more, he clarified, “Look, what 
should be the warhead of a weapon like this? Why should I send a 
few tonnes of TNT over 1500kms? The weapon‟s payload has to be 
nuclear…But I don‟t have it. It‟s for the cabinet to decide when to 
have the nuclear warhead. Till they decide, I have nothing more to 
do with the missile…Every time I test (the Agni), I am burning up 
costly hardware which I can‟t afford. So I had packed more than 
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600 parameters in three tests. My missile is ready” (Prasannan, 
2015). 
As a result of this, following the test of Agni-I but India started 
concentrating on advanced versions of the Agni-1 and in 1999, 
India under the auspices of the Defence Research and Development 
Organisation (DRDO), test fired the Agni-II medium range ballistic 
missile with improved guidance system with a range of 2000kms. 
With Agni II, India took a great leap in missile technology. While 
the earlier version, Agni-I, used liquid fuel in the first stage and 
solid in the second, Agni-II used solid fuel in both the stages, 
thereby, drastically cutting down preparation time for launching 
the missile that enabled India to move closer to developing a 
„credible‟ counter strike capability.  
India‟s constant development of Agni category missiles resulted in 
Pakistan too hastening with its missile development programme 
and following the test firing of Agni-II, Pakistan despite 
international plea for restraint, tested in 1999, the liquid fuelled 
medium range Ghauri missile and solid fuelled short range 
Shaheen-1 missile (Arms Control Association, 1999). 
The Agni-I and Agni-II underwent several tests since then in order 
to ensure the operational readiness of the missiles. In 2004, the 
Agni-I missile was successfully inducted into the Indian Army 
(Taneja, 2018). Even after the induction, Agni-I had undergone 
several tests to check its operational readiness. The Agni-II entered 
service in 2004. However, due to failed tests and technical issues,  
Agni-II  achieved operational capability only in the year 2011 
(Missile Threat, 2016).  In fact, 2011 was a landmark year for India‟s 
nuclear deterrence as it was in the same year that the intermediate 
range Agni-III was also inducted in the Indian Army (News 18, 
2017). The Agni-III with a range of 3000 kms underwent the first 
trial test in the year 2006 but there were several problems during 
the test and hence, the missile underwent its second test in 2007. 
Agni-III was developed owing to the need to develop long range 
missile system with deep strike capability against China that could 
hold major Chinese cities under threat.  
However, despite the fact that India had developed Agni-III with a 
range of 3000 kms, they still needed to develop a longer range 
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capability that could have greater ability to strike deep within 
China. This led to the development of the Agni-IV intermediate 
range ballistic missile. The missile had a range of 4000kms and was 
tested in 2011, 2012, twice in 2014, once in 2015 and once in 2017 
(Subramanian, 2017). India‟s desire to achieve inter-continental 
range capability further led India to develop the Agni-V missile 
with a range of 5000kms. However, there are reports that the 
missile has been kept on depressed trajectory to restrict the range to 
5000kms. Nevertheless, the 2012 Agni test became a milestone 
achievement for India‟s nuclear deterrence and according to the 
then Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, the test was “another 
milestone in our quest to add to the credibility of our security and 
preparedness and to continuously explore the frontiers of science” 
(Auner, 2012). 
There are assumptions that the Indo-US nuclear deal led to the 
restriction of the range of the Agni-V missile. In fact, Chinese media 
has reported the missile to have a range of 9000kms and that 
according to them, India has kept the range of the missile restricted 
to 5000kms due to US and NATO pressure. (The Economic Times, 
2012). There are also reports that the range of the missile was 
strategically delayed by India to secure its membership into the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) (Ranghuvanshi, 2016). 
The Agni-V underwent „developmental trials‟ with „open 
configuration tests‟ in the year 2012 and 2013 and later in the years 
2015 and 2016, the missile underwent test fire from hermitically 
sealed canisters (Pandit, 2018). 
3. Technical Parameters of Agni Category Missiles 
Agni-I: the missile is a single stage short range ballistic missile 
system with a specialised navigation system that can reach the 
target with a high degree of accuracy and precision. The missile can 
carry payload up to 1000kgs (The Hindu, 2018). The upper stage of 
the missile is a liquid propulsion system while the lower stage is 
solid propulsion and the missile was derived from Prithvi with a 
strap down inertial navigation system that adopts explicit 
guidance. Carbon composite structures are used in the missile for 
protection of the payload. In its present form, the missile is 
expected to reach targets within 700kms-900 of range (Taneja, 
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2018a). It is capable of being launched from rail based as well as 
road based mobile launchers. There are also reports that Agni-I had 
undergone significant modifications and improvements in its re-
entry technology and maneuverability (Rout, 2010). The missile did 
not have fins.  
Agni-II: Agni II is a solid propelled mobile missile with a range of 
2000 kms and a payload capacity of 1000 kgs equipped with 
advanced high accuracy navigation system guided by state-of-art 
command and control system (Taneja, 2018b). With a reduced 
payload, the missile is reported to reach targets up to a range of 
3500kms. The missile is a two-stage missile unlike the Agni-I that 
was a single stage missile. The Agni-II also is equipped with Post 
Boost Vehicle (PBV) that could be integrated into the missile‟s re-
entry vehicle (Business Standard, 2017).  The booster stage is more 
powerful than that of Agni-I as it uses the same booster of the Polar 
Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV).  The newer Agni-II missiles use 
side thrust motors instead of fins as used in the older Agni-II 
versions and a combination of inertial navigation and GPS in its 
guidance system.  
Agni-III: the Agni-III missile has a range of 3000kms and a payload 
capacity of 1.5tons. It is a two-stage solid propelled ballistic missile 
(Business Standard, 2017a).  The missile is reported to be shorter 
and wider and capable of carrying a heavier warhead than Agni-I 
and Agni-II missiles. The missile is both road and rail mobile. 
Chromium coating on the missile provides the missile with 
increased range. The missile achieves greater accuracy due to the 
re-entry vehicle using imaging infra-red or active seekers. In fact, 
the missile is considered to be one of the most accurate missile 
systems in the world (Army Technology, 2018). 
Agni-IV: like the other Agni versions, Agni-IV missile is nuclear 
capable with a range of 4000kms and is expected to be a deterrence 
against China. The missile uses jam proof ring laser gyroscope for 
navigation and has features to correct and guide itself for in-flight 
disturbances. The missile also has micro navigation system- all 
these features providing the missile with greater accuracy (Bagia, 
2017). 
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Agni-V:  the Agni-V is reported to have a range of 5000kms though 
there are views that the missile has an inter-continental range 
exceeding above 5500kms. Though the Agni-V is the longer range 
version of the Agni series, the missile has far advanced navigation 
and guidance system as well as a warhead and engine (The Times 
of India, 2018). The navigation system is supported by a unique 
fault tolerance software installed in the missile. The carbon-carbon 
composite heat shield is meant to protect the payload and 
maintains the temperature inside the missile below 50 degrees 
Celsius (Hindustan Times, 2016).  The missile is planned to become 
an all-composite missile that would be much lighter than the older 
version (Shukla, 2016). 
The missile can be canister launched. This provides the missile with 
lesser preparation time to launch as compared to „open 
configuration test‟. The missile is highly reliable with a longer 
shelf-life. Unlike the other versions of the Agni missile, the Agni-V 
is a three-stage solid propelled ballistic missile. There are 
assumptions that the missile may be fitted with multiple 
independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) as well as with 
maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MaRV). Both technologies being 
developed by the DRDO. The missile is expected to be inducted in 
December after another pre-induction test. The missile would be 
capable of reaching targets in important cities in China like Beijing 
and Shanghai to name a few (Live Mint, 2018). At the moment, the 
government plans to restrict itself with a 5000 km range missile but 
strategic compulsions and requirements could coerce India to seek 
for longer ranges.  
4. Global View of the Agni System 
The Agni series and the conduction of the flight tests have always 
been a concern for the international order. But the West today 
raises lesser concerns on test-firing and only requests for restraint. 
However, the Agni-V targeted against China did raise concerns in 
China and they voiced their discontent over the missile flight tests. 
The first time that India test-fired the Agni-V missile in 2012, the 
then China‟s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Liu Weimin stated, 
“China and India are both emerging powers. We are not rivals, but 
cooperative partners”(Parthasarathy, 2017).  He further stated, 
Artha-Journal of Social Sciences, Vol.17, No.4                        ISSN 0975-329X 
60 
 
“China always maintains that preserving the strategic balance and 
stability in South Asia is conducive to peace and prosperity of 
regional countries and beyond”(Roy, 2017).  However, amid these 
soft tones, in 2012, China  maintained a stern view on the Agni-V, 
and a state run daily, Global Times also reported, “India was being 
swept up by missile delusion” and that China‟s neighbours could 
never win an arms race with China (Burke, 2012). In 2017, China‟s 
state run Global Times accused India of violating UN restrictions 
on range of missiles over the Agni-IV test and instead claimed that 
Pakistan should also be allowed the same privileges (The Economic 
Times, 2018b). The daily also claimed, “if western countries accept 
India as a nuclear country and are indifferent to the nuclear race 
between India and Pakistan, China will not stand out and stick 
rigidly to those nuclear rules as necessary.” At the same time, the 
daily further stated, “New Delhi understands that it does little 
good to itself if the Sino-Indian relations are ruined by any 
geopolitical tricks” (The Express Tribune, 2017). 
The United States that views India as a strong partner in the Indian 
Ocean Region (IOR) to counter China‟s growing influence also 
refrained from criticising India‟s 2012 Agni-V test and instead 
applauded India‟s non-proliferation efforts then (Rajghatta, 2012). 
This came as a stark difference between how the US viewed India‟s 
missile capabilities from the early 2000s and now. In 2003, when 
India tested the shorter range Agni-I version, the United States 
criticised India, “We think tests like this contribute to a charged 
atmosphere, make it harder to prevent a costly and destabilising 
nuclear arms race” (The Tribune, 2003). 
Pakistan on the other hand reacted to Pakistan centric Agni tests 
with tit-for-tat tests. For instance, when in 1999, India tested its 
Agni-II missile, Pakistan followed suit by testing the Ghauri missile 
followed by the Shaheen-I missile (Chengappa, 1999). In 2003, 
Pakistan‟s then Information Minister, Shaikh Rashid claimed the 
Agni tests to be „sick war hysteria‟ at the same time warning India 
that such tests conducted by India would not help New Delhi to 
“establish its supremacy in the region”  (Chengappa, 2003). Prior to 
this, in 2001, Pakistan reacted to Agni-II missile criticising India, 
“India‟s nuclear ambitions, which are clear from its draft nuclear 
doctrine announced in 1999, have a destabilising effect on the 
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region” (BBC, 2001). In fact, just after India‟s testing of China-
centric Agni missiles, Pakistan in March 2018, acquired a powerful 
missile tracking system from China that is expected to speed up 
Pakistan‟s ability to develop MIRV technology.  
5. Agni and Nuclear Deterrence 
That Agni constitutes the backbone of India‟s land-based nuclear 
deterrence just like the Shaheen category ballistic missiles for 
Pakistan and the Dong Feng category missiles for China. The 
Shaheen is a category of solid propelled ballistic missile and more 
advanced than the liquid propelled obsolete Ghauri missiles. 
Pakistan has developed a longer range version of the missile also 
that can reach targets up to 2750kms putting India‟s naval assets in 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands under threat. At the same time, 
China too has shifted its focus from liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles 
to solid fuelled ones for easier survivability and mobility. China is 
also working on missile defence systems as well as sophisticated 
offensive weapons like MIRVs, MaRVs and also hypersonic glide 
vehicles (HGVs). HGVs are hypersonic weapon systems that could 
be mounted atop a ballistic missile that would not only enable the 
missile to deliver payload at a faster pace but also evade the 
adversary missile defence system.   
Solid propulsion systems, use of increased stages to increase 
ranges, advanced guidance and navigation system equipped with 
the missile, easy mobility- all these characteristics in a missile make 
the system more credible and reliable thereby strengthening India‟s 
strategy of „credible minimum deterrence.‟ Mobility makes the 
missiles more easily survivable to enemy attack thereby 
strengthening their ability to launch „counter/second strike‟ vis-à-
vis adversaries.  
The concept of credibility also has less to do with how credible 
India feels its nuclear deterrence is and more to do with how 
credible the adversaries feel about India ‟s nuclear deterrence. With 
two neighbours with nuclear capability, India needed to have 
nuclear weapons delivery systems that could not only carry nuclear 
warheads but also be able to successfully deliver the same despite 
enemy defence by denial mechanisms. For instance, canister 
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launched missiles are more agile and capable of dodging enemy 
radars and also spy satellites (The New Indian Express, 2018b). 
Solid propulsion missile systems are also more difficult to intercept 
than liquid propulsion system. In addition, solid propulsion system 
makes launch easier thereby, enhancing the capability of the missile 
to be launched in a short time. Use of decoys in missiles like Agni-
III version further makes them difficult to be intercepted. Though it 
is not clear if Agnis would be based in silos also, there is a 
possibility that a humble number of missiles are silo-based with 
dummy silos too to evade missile attacks. It is also possible that 
over the years, India has also hardened the silos to avoid the enemy 
from attacking and destroying the missiles kept in the silos.  
India and China have been in the past involved in stand-off crises, 
and the Dokhlam stand-off is one such example. It is crucial for 
India to develop deterrence against China. China though has 
adopted a policy of „no-first-use‟, such a policy does not apply to 
territories that China considers to be a part of its own territory. This 
has been with Taiwan and India‟s Arunachal Pradesh as they are 
considered to be a part of China‟s own territory. In addition, the 
then Air Chief in 2017 raised concerns on China‟s economic and 
military ties with Pakistan and India‟s neighbours, rapid 
infrastructural growth in Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) and 
China‟s venture into Gwadar port (PIB, 2017). Agni-V is not just a 
weapon that strengthens India‟s nuclear deterrence but also can be 
a weapon that can prove its mettle in coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis 
China (Ghoshal, 2018).  
6. Issues and Problems 
The operational capability of a missile can only be strengthened 
when all the Agni category missile systems continuously undergo 
flight tests. Only then would the technical hazards pertaining to the 
missile systems be well fathomed and dealt with. For instance, in 
2017, the Agni-II flight test experienced failure due to technical 
hazards (Hindustan Times, 2018). What was more of a concern is 
the fact that the missile failed to meet all parameters even after 
being in years of service. These are technical hiccups that India 
needs to deal with in order to improve its nuclear deterrent 
capability vis-à-vis Pakistan as well as China. 
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In addition, while canister-launch missile systems could enhance 
India‟s ability to launch counter-strike against adversaries, the 
same system could make nuclear deterrence destabilising as 
canister launched missile would indicate that missiles are ready for 
deployment in their mated form- that is warheads are mated with 
their delivery systems. As of now, India‟s nuclear warheads are not 
mated with their delivery systems and India follows a posture of 
„recessed deterrence.‟ At the same time, Indian military starkly 
draws a distinction between deployment and induction and views 
the former as a wartime arrangement and the latter to be a peace-
time arrangement and carefully uses the word „induction‟ for the 
same. Mated Agni-V missile could jeopardise this distinction 
between wartime and peace time arrangements and further 
endanger strategic stability. In fact, in 2003, the then President of 
Pakistan, Parvez Musharraf had ruled out any possibility of 
accidental nuclear war on grounds that Pakistan‟s nuclear 
warheads were not mated with delivery systems, “This is not a 
Warsaw Pact or NATO situation where warheads and missiles 
were ready for fire with a button in hand. There is no button in our 
case. Missiles and warheads are not permitted together. There is a 
geographical separation between them. One has to go up the 
escalation ladder to come to the stage of pressing of the button” 
(The Tribune, 2003). 
However, the threat of unauthorised use of such weapons systems 
is less as India already follows a „no-first-use‟ doctrine and due to 
the virtue of the written doctrine, would not be using the nuclear-
capable missile unless adversaries have used nuclear or chemical or 
biological weapons against it. Also, MIRVs are according to Cold 
War literature, first-strike weapon systems while India has adopted 
a policy of „no-first-use‟. Hence, New Delhi would need to ensure 
that it's political and strategic signalling of the MIRVs are well 
fathomed by adversaries. India needs to convey efficiently to China 
and Pakistan that MIRVs would be used as a credible „counter-
strike‟ weapons and not as a first-strike weapon system.  
Not only for nuclear deterrence but also a country‟s soft power is 
reliant on its hard power prowess. India has been vying for the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent membership 
seat and while economic growth and economic development play a 
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crucial role in determining this, hard power prowess also adds to 
the possibility.  
7. Does Agni Pose a Threat to the United States? 
The range of Agni-V does not pose any threat to the mainland 
United States. However, the missile can reach targets in the Indo-
Pacific Region but India‟s missile systems are not targeted against 
any country. The United States and India have formed strong 
partnerships and are crucial partners in the Indo-Pacific Region to 
counter China. Today India is a member of the Quadrilateral 
Dialogue (QUAD) including other members like the United States, 
Japan and Australia to check the growing influence of China in the 
region. China‟s long-range missile systems could easily target US 
forward bases in the Asia Pacific region and can also reach Japan 
and Australia. This is probably the reason why the United States 
realised the importance of including India as a partner. In fact, as 
has been mentioned earlier, the United States have had a change in 
how they viewed India‟s missile development programs and 
nuclear capability in the last few years, and have also granted the 
Nuclear Suppliers‟ Group (NSG) waiver to India despite India not 
being a member to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  
New Delhi, of course, has been careful to maintain that it does not 
view QUAD as a group intended against any specific country 
evident from Prime Minister Narendra Modi‟s statement, “India 
does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of 
limited members. Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And 
by no means do we consider it directed against any country…But 
our friendships are not alliances of containment” (Patranobis, 
2018).  
8. Agni and Credible Minimum Deterrence 
While Agni surely enhances India‟s credible minimum deterrence 
posture, it cannot strengthen the posture alone. Agni only 
constitutes for India‟s land-based nuclear deterrence and to ensure 
that „credible minimum deterrence‟ is indeed credible, India would 
also need to equally focus on aerial and sea-based nuclear delivery 
Debalina Ghoshal                                                 India‟s Agni Missile Systems 
65 
 
platform- together the three legs would enable India to effectively 
launch counter and second strike vis-à-vis adversaries.  
In addition, missile systems especially land-based systems would 
also need to be protected from enemy attacks. While road and rail 
mobility are options, India is also working on ballistic missile 
defence (BMD) system to intercept incoming enemy missile 
systems. Though the system is mostly to protect counter-value 
targets, New Delhi should concentrate on protecting counter-force 
targets including land-based missile systems. At the same time, 
Agni with MIRVs as mentioned before can raise concerns in 
adversaries‟ minds that India may have adopted „first-use‟ policy in 
its nuclear doctrine. In addition, BMD can also be used both as an 
offensive and defensive system. For instance, adversaries can be 
concerned that India may use its offensive missile capabilities like 
Agni to launch a „first-strike‟ on their nuclear forces and use its 
BMD system to prevent adversaries‟ missile systems to launch a 
counter-attack on India‟s nuclear and conventional capabilities. 
However, India needs to clearly elaborate its BMD posture in order 
to avoid any confusion and state that the BMD would be deployed 
to strengthen India‟s „no-first-use doctrine.‟ 
9. Conclusion 
It is not clear if Agni would be used as a counter-strike or second- 
strike weapon system. Whether the system is used for counter-
strike or second-strike, India would continuously need to conduct 
flight tests of the Agni systems to check their operational readiness. 
These tests need to be conducted on a regular basis during 
morning, evening or night. Also, training a military personnel to 
launch the missile at any time of the day whenever the need may 
arise is of prime importance. Operational readiness of missile 
systems would strengthen India‟s credible minimum deterrence 
posture and promote these weapon systems as weapons of peace 
rather than war-fighting weapons. While Agni-VI has been 
speculated, the government has denied any such efforts or 
programmes being carried out by India. However, should India‟s 
strategic compulsion coerce India to develop so, New Delhi surely 
would go ahead with such capability.  
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